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Abstract  
This paper focuses on the changing landscape of rural local government since the start of 
Zimbabwe’s current political and economic crisis in 2000. The paper questions the liberal-
democratic assumption that casts the period ‘before the crisis’ as some kind of mythical Eden 
of normal government and well-functioning democracy. At the same time, it recognises that 
the scale, terms and intensity of the post-2000 disruptions denote a dramatic era of altering 
politics and practices of government that require close attention. It further argues that local 
government is not just a front for national processes of state making and rule. Rather, it has 
its own localised sets of conditions and dynamics which, when articulating with national 
projects of power, production and accumulation, necessarily produce diverse, unpredictable 
and often unstable results.  
 
 
Introduction 
In February 2002, two years after ‘the Zimbabwe crisis’ is said to have started, an article in 
Zimbabwe’s former independent daily newspaper, The Daily News, summarised what it saw 
as the profound undermining of ‘normal’ practices of government by the actions of ‘so-called 
war veterans’. This gave voice to a fairly widespread public fear that Zimbabwe had entirely 
lost its bearings:  
The grim reality…is that we haven’t got a normal government in Zimbabwe. 
Whatever the so-called war veterans say is what goes. They can sack teachers, 
nurses, and district council officials, order the transfer of magistrates, district 
administrators and senior police officers, close down schools, clinics and rural 
district council offices. They can disrupt any court proceedings. And, with 
absolute impunity, they can harass, torture or order anybody’s arrest.2 
 
The article went on to argue that the farm invasions that began two years earlier in February 
2000 were far from “peaceful demonstrations against the government for its slow pace in land 
acquisition and redistribution” as officially claimed. Rather, they were “the beginning of the 
anarchy which has now become a national curse: the tragedy of government by war 
veterans”.3  
                                                 
1  This paper was invited for publication by the Crisis States Research Centre. Thanks to Donald Moore for 
critical provocations related to initial ideas in this paper, and to Blair Rutherford, Jeremy Gould, Eric Worby, 
Stig Jensen and Brian Raftopoulos for comments on related drafts. Responsibility for all errors in judgment 
remains mine alone. 
2  The Daily News, 2 February 2002, emphasis added.  
3 The Daily News, 2 February 2002, emphasis added. See also JoAnn McGregor, ‘The Politics of Disruption: 
War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe’, African Affairs, 101 (2002), pp 9-37.  
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In late May and June 2005, another form of ‘abnormal’ and ‘anarchic’ government was 
played out, as hundreds of thousands of the urban poor were made homeless and destitute by 
the abrupt demolition and burning of so-called illegal dwellings and informal trading 
structures in all of Zimbabwe’s urban areas, forcing people into the countryside. Yet while 
this was being condemned worldwide as inhumane and seen as clearly linked to destroying 
opposition supporters concentrated in urban areas,4 the President and his ministers were 
representing the ‘clean-up campaign’ as necessary to stamp out disease and crime and restore 
hygiene and ‘orderliness’ to the cities.5 
 
Consistently since 2000, a quite different interpretation of events to that presented by the 
independent media has been produced by President Mugabe’s ruling Zanu (PF) and its 
various allies.6 The regime’s version asserts that what has been underway since 2000 is the 
‘Third Chimurenga’: the final stage of nationalist revolution that will culminate in finally 
reclaiming Zimbabwe’s ‘lost lands’, combating recolonisation and completing ‘the war 
against imperialism’, wresting economic control from minority white settlers and placing it in 
the hands of indigenous black Zimbabweans, and establishing a form of authentic African 
governance. Within this framework, concern for human rights, democracy, press freedom and 
the independence of the judiciary are dismissed as “a smokescreen to maintain the colonial 
grip on Zimbabwe”. 7 In fact anyone challenging Zanu (PF)’s account of patriotic history, 
ideals of sovereignty and authentic African governance, or self-proclaimed role as the sole 
bearer of national liberation, is defined as a traitor. 
 
As Zimbabwe prepared for new parliamentary elections on 31 March 2005 under conditions 
of entrenched authoritarian rule, sustained political violence, the politicisation of food, and 
deepening economic and humanitarian crisis,8 ‘normal government’ (in the liberal-democratic 
sense implied by The Daily News report) had certainly not been restored, if indeed it had ever 
existed.9 Yet responsibility for its ongoing disruption was acknowledged by then as extending 
well beyond war veterans to include the entire Zanu (PF) party-state machinery, including the 
army and police, the ruling party youth militia, state bureaucrats, and chiefs and headmen.10  
On the other hand, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), emerging as it 
had from a combination of the labour movement and a wide spectrum of civil society 
                                                 
4 See ‘Zimbabwe’s cleanup takes a vast human toll’, New York Times, 11 June 2005; ‘How Mugabe is burning 
opponents out of their homes’, Independent (UK), 12 June 2005. 
5 See ‘Siyaso Demolished’, The Herald, 31 May 2005; ‘State to relocate informal traders’, The Herald, 2 June 
2005. 
6  See Wendy Willems, ‘Peasant Demonstrators, Violent Invaders: Representations of Land in the Zimbabwean 
Press’, World Development, 32:10 (2004), pp.1767-1783.     
7 The Herald, 9 December 2003, quoted in Ian Phimister & Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics 
of Anti-Imperialism’, Review of African Political Economy , 101 (2004), pp.127-143.  
8 See, for example, Solidarity Peace Trust, Subverting Justice: The Role of the Judiciary in Denying the Will of 
the Zimbabwean Electorate Since 2000, Joahnnesburg: Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005; ‘Zimbabwe. Not Eligible: 
The Politicization of Food in Zimbabwe,’ Human Rights Watch, 15:17A (October 2003); Brian McGarry, ‘The 
Zimbabwe Economy in 2004’, Zimbabwe Review, 05:1 (February 2005). 
9 Kriger challenges representations of any of Zimbabwe’s so-called multi-party elections as “either a democratic 
system or one that was amenable to democratization” (Norma Kriger, ‘Zanu (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 
1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion’, Africa, 104:414, (2005), pp.1-34). 
10 See, for example, ‘Air Force officers order new farmers off property’, Daily Mirror (Zimb.), 14 February 
2005; ‘Mugabe henchmen on the warpath’, IWPR, 25 February 2005; ‘Police officers forced to attend 
ideological re-orientation course’, Zim Online (SA), 28 September 2004;  ‘Chief pledges to weed out MDC 
supporters from area’, Zim Online (SA) , 10 Oct 2004; ‘Back Zanu PF or starve, chiefs tell villagers’, Zim Online 
(SA), 8 February 2005; ‘Mugabe using traditional leaders, says MDC’, Sapa, 26 March 2005.  
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groupings, had established itself explicitly in opposition to violence and in favour of the rule 
of law, and was “offer[ing] itself as the way to return to normality”.11  
 
Yet while The Daily News report fell far short of a comprehensive analysis of what was 
unfolding in Zimbabwe at the time, it nonetheless highlighted the dissolution of familiar 
forms of order that constituted a significant part of the crisis. Among other things, it raised 
interesting questions about competing notions of normal government and changing modes of 
rule during very abnormal times.  
 
A particular focus of the Crisis States Research Centre has been on the relationship between 
deepening processes of globalisation and liberalisation over the past few decades and 
emerging patterns of crisis, breakdown and state collapse in developing countries.12 Although 
the crisis in Zimbabwe can certainly be explained in part by these trends, not least the effects 
of adopting structural adjustment policies in the early 1990s,13 it has a far more complex 
provenance and interweaving set of trajectories and effects. The present paper focuses 
primarily on the dimension of state making and changing modes of rule. Specifically, it 
examines the ways in which the landscape of local government, especially rural local 
government, has been changing since the start of the crisis.  
 
The paper begins by outlining the overall background and nature of Zimbabwe’s current 
crisis. The three following sections examine in turn the contested search for ‘normal’ 
government, the growing normalisation of violence as a technology of rule, and shifts in the 
practices of traditional authorities towards their constituents resulting from intensified 
partisan politics. The paper then provides an overview of the making of post-independence 
rural local government before examining the various threats and challenges to this system 
emerging under present conditions of crisis, and the possible consequences this has for 
democratic governance and development in the future.  
 
 
Tracing the Crisis 
The onset of the Zimbabwe crisis is generally associated with the watershed constitutional 
referendum held in February 2000, in which key constitutional amendments proposed by the 
Zanu (PF) government, in a far from democratic process, were rejected by a majority ‘no’ 
vote. Among the key contentious issues were proposals to: absolve government from having 
to pay compensation for any expropriated land if Britain did not make funds available; 
increase executive powers with respect to military intervent ion within or outside Zimbabwe; 
introduce compulsory national service; and to allow for an unlimited presidential term of 
office for the present incumbent.14 In addition, according to Brian Kagoro, “it was a protest 
vote against the manner in which the cons titution-making process had been carried out by the 
                                                 
11 Suzanne Dansereau, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe’s Development Impasse’, in Henning 
Melber (ed.), Zimbabwe – the Political Economy of Decline, Discussion Paper 27, Uppsala: Nordisk 
Afrikainstitutet,  2005. 
12 James Putzel, ‘The Political Impact of Globalisation and Liberalisation: Evidence Emerging from Crisis States 
Research’, Crisis States Discussion Paper, 7, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2004. 
13 See E.A. Brett, ‘From Corporatism to Liberalisation in Zimbabwe: Economic Policy Regimes and Political 
Crisis (1980-1997)’, Crisis States Working Paper, 58, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2005; also 
Brian Raftopoulos & Ian Phimister, ‘Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion’, Historical 
Materialism, 12:4 (2004). 
14 See Brian Kagoro, ‘Constitutional Reform as Social Movement. A Critical Narrative of the Constitution-
Making Debate in Zimbabwe, 1997-2000’, in Brian Raftopoulos & Tyrone Savage (eds), Zimbabwe. Injustice 
and Political Reconciliation , Cape Town, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004, pp.236-256 
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government”, as well as “an angry protest against the performance of the government and 
parlous state of the economy”. 15 This unprecedented defeat of the ruling party by an 
opposition it saw as being backed by white commercial farmers and the West appeared to 
precipitate the largely state-sponsored land invasions,16 political violence, institutional 
interference and economic decline that were to follow, although there was of course a much 
longer and more complex history behind these trends.17 The present crisis has often been 
represented by opposing sides of a deeply polarised political divide as either a ‘land crisis’ 
(this mostly by Zanu (PF) and old-style nationalists) or a ‘governance crisis’ (by the 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and a broad spectrum of civil society 
groupings).  
 
However, as Hammar and Raftopoulos have argued, “the crisis is not about a single issue, 
neither is it rooted in a one-off event or single historical trajectory”. Rather it emerged from, 
and is sustained by, a dynamic pattern of “simultaneous, incomplete and competing projects 
of transformation, legitimation and resistance” that involve a range of differently positioned 
actors in shifting combinations of alliance and animosity. Among the most salient of these 
projects since independence in 1980 are those connected to three interweaving analytical and  
empirical arenas: “the politics of land and resource distribution; reconstructions of nation and 
citizenship; and the remaking of state and modes of rule”. 18  
 
Of course, these need to be considered within the context of, among other things: Zimbabwe’s 
long settler-colonial history of embedded inequalities in land and civic rights, which were 
deeply racialised as well as gendered and class-based; the nationalist guerrilla struggle during 
the 1970s; an inherited bureaucracy at independence with strong technocratic, centralising and 
authoritarian tendencies; the positive expansion of public services and infrastructure during 
the 1980s and initial economic growth, followed by economic decline and the adoption of 
standard structural adjustment policies in 1991 whose complex and mostly negative impacts 
were exacerbated by drought; the end of the Cold War and global shifts in both ideological 
paradigms and trade and aid parameters; declining state legitimacy in the 1990s, reflected in 
growing labour strikes and pub lic protests towards the late 1990s, culminating in both a 
broad-based constitutional challenge driven by civil society and the formation of the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as a formal opposition party in 1999; further 
challenges to the state and ruling party by war veterans in 1997, and added economic strains 
caused by Zimbabwe’s entrance into the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998; 
and the failure of the new land reform initiatives of the late 1990s.  
 
At the same time, the crisis and its varied effects have deepened and mutated on multiple 
levels since 2000. By early 2005, following the forced eviction of over 4000 white 
                                                 
15 Kagoro (2004), p.249. 
16 For distinctions between these and the spontaneous occupations of the late 1990s, see Jocelyn Alexander, 
‘‘Squatters’, Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe’, and Nelson Marongwe, ‘Farm Occupations and Occupiers in 
the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe’, in Amanda Hammar et al. (eds), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: 
Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, Harare: Weaver Press, 2003.    
17 See, for example, Brian Raftopoulos & Lloyd Sachikonye (eds), Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the 
Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980-2000, Harare: Weaver Press, 2001; Patrick Bond & Masimba Manyanya, 
Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice, London: Merlin 
Press, 2002; Hammar et al. (2003); Terence Ranger (ed.), The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human 
Rights in Zimbabwe. Volume Two: Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights, Nationalism, Democracy and 
Human Rights, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2003.   
18 Amanda Hammar & Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and 
Nation’, in Hammar et al.(2003), pp.2-3. 
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commercial farmers and hundreds of thousands of farm workers and their dependents, there 
had been a substantial decline in commercial agriculture.19 This had precipitated major losses 
in export earnings, widespread unemployment in both rural and urban sectors – estimated to 
be above 70 percent – and a dire threat to national food security. 20 At the same time, the 
anticipated stimulation of successful small- and medium-scale capitalist farming as a result of 
the ‘fast track’ resettlement programme had not materialised due to, among other things, the 
government’s failure to deliver critical farm inputs, technical services, infrastructure and 
security to new settlers. Consequently there has been a remarkably low uptake of plots – 
acknowledged by President Mugabe himself to be as low as 44 percent in some places – as 
well as very low productivity levels on those plots that are being worked.21 This is set against 
the apparently extensive distribution of ‘liberated’ white farms to the political, business and 
bureaucratic elites,22 often resulting in the violent eviction of those impoverished ‘new 
settlers’ who were at the forefront of the state-supported land invasions.23 Mines have also 
become the target of partial if not total nationalisation. 24  
 
Added to the above, environmental destruction has been widespread, threatening biodiversity 
in all land tenure areas including national parks, undermining in particular a once thriving 
wildlife-based tourist industry critical to the generation of foreign currency. 25 All of this – 
exacerbated by drought in 2002/03, and ongoing conditions of political violence and 
instability – has contributed to a dramatic fall in GDP and rise in foreign debt,26 soaring 
inflation and collapsing currency, substantial decline in investment,27 shortages of fuel, food 
and foreign currency, diminished public sector capacity, rising rates of HIV/AIDS,28 and 
increased scales of poverty overall. Much of this assessment has been denied through the 
state-controlled media. For example, in April 2005 The Herald quoted the president of the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries – speaking to a visiting delegation of Japanese 
investors – bemoaning the fact that Japan, among other countries, “has been fed with negative 
reports on Zimbabwe which distorted the prevailing economic environment”. 29   
 
In terms of the consequences for justice and democratic rights and practices, the crisis has 
both exposed and generated patterns of authoritarian repression, almost all of which have 
been targeted at, or applied selectively to, people claimed by government to be 
                                                 
19 See McGarry (2005).  
20 Food shortages, verging on famine in some areas, have turned Zimbabwe from a former ‘bread basket’ into a 
country in which over half its population are said to be dependent on food aid. See ‘Zim faces famine’, Mail and 
Guardian (SA), 28 April 2004. 
21 See ‘White land grab policy has failed, Mugabe confesses’, Daily Telegraph (UK), 3 March 2005.  
22 See, for example, Edwa rd Lahiff, ‘The Politics of Land Reform in Southern Africa’ Sustainable Livelihoods in 
Southern Africa Research Paper 19, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2003; Robin Palmer, ‘Land 
Reform Highlights in Southern Africa, 2003-4’, Independent Land Newsletter, Oxford: Oxfam (UK), 2004. 
23 See ‘Top Zanu PF officials snatch farms’, Zim Online (SA) , 2 October 2004; ‘More settlers evicted from 
commercial farms’, IRIN (UN), 27 September 2004. 
24 Dansereau (2005).  
25 See ‘Wildlife sanctuary now a hunting ground’, Daily Telegraph (UK), 14 August 2004. 
26 By late 2002, GDP was said to have fallen by 24% and foreign debt had risen from 2% to 30% of GDP. See 
‘Zimbabwe’s agony as Mugabe avoids crunch’, The Times (UK), 28 October 2002; also International Crisis 
Group, Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict?, Brussels: ICG, 2002. 
27 Foreign direct investment was calculated to have dropped from USD 436 million in 1998 to USD 4.5 million 
in 2001. In March 2002, the World Economic Forum rated Zimbabwe the least competitive economy out of 75 
countries surveyed (cited in ICG, ‘Zimbabwe: What Next?’, Africa Report, 47 (June 2002b)). The IMF estimates 
that the economy shrunk by 30% between 1999 and 2004. 
28 See ‘Zimbabwe in crisis as Aids kills 300 a day’, The Times (UK), 5 December 2002. 
29 ‘Japanese keen to invest in Zim’ The Herald, 21 April 2005. See also ‘Mugabe harvests lies as Zimbabwe 
faces shortages’, Times (UK), 9 July 2004.  
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members/supporters of the political opposition. This includes: the introduction of draconian 
legislation that severely restricts political freedom (especially the Public Order and Security 
Act, POSA) and freedom of expression more generally (Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act, AIPPA), resulting in the closing of political space and the closing down of 
independent newspapers and persecution or expulsion of independent journalists; persistent 
political violence, including torture and rape, exacerbated by the establishment of a loyalist 
youth militia;30 the undermining of the independence of the judiciary and uneven application 
of the law;31 deprofessionalisation of the bureaucracy, politicisation of the security services 
and armed forces, and militarisation of everyday life;32 compulsory introduction into 
educational syllabi of ‘patriotic history’ and ‘Mugabeism’;33 and the inculcation of an ethic of 
suspicion and fear amongst ordinary citizens.34 
 
Associated with the extremes of both economic and political decline since 2000, there has 
been widescale internal displacement and severe impoverishment especially of ex-farm 
workers and also, increasingly, of opposition supporters. In addition, there has been a mass 
exodus of citizens as both political and economic refugees to countries within the southern 
Africa region, particularly South Africa, and further afield, particularly to Britain. 35 The 
Zimbabwe government itself has estimated that out of approximately five million potentially 
productive adults, 3.4 million are outside Zimbabwe, constituting a remarkable 60 to 70 per 
cent of productive adults. This has created a substantial brain drain of Zimbabwe’s 
professionals and its most educated. At the same time, many of the several million exiles now 
in South Africa are illegal and living under conditions of extreme distress and vulnerability;36 
and even where their numbers are fewer, it is creating local as well as diplomatic tensions 
between Zimbabwe and her neighbours.37  
 
Not surprisingly, the Zimbabwe crisis has increasingly taken on a significant regional and 
global dimension. 38 For South Africa in particular, Zimbabwe has become a key factor in both 
its foreign policy and domestic agendas, with President Mbeki being named by US President 
Bush in 2004 as his ‘point man’ on Zimbabwe. Britain, on the other hand, has reduced its 
public critique of Zimbabwe, having previously played into Mugabe’s anti-colonial rhetoric 
with its initial over-emphasis of the plight of white farmers. Much of President Mugabe’s 
diplomatic successes in certain non-Western quarters have been stimulated by his  revival of 
Pan-Africanist liberation politics and use of anti- imperialist discourse.39 However, his 
                                                 
30 See Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: the Toll of Impunity, London: Amnesty International, 2002. 
31 See Solidarity Peace Trust (2005). 
32 See Martin R. Rupiya, ‘Contextualising the Military in Zimbabwe Between 1999 and 2004 and Beyond’, in 
Raftopoulos & Savage (2004), pp.79-98. 
33 Terence Ranger, ‘The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe’, Keynote speech at the international 
conference Looking to the Future: Social, Political and Cultural Space in Zimbabwe, Nordic Africa Institute, 
Uppsala, Sweden, 24 May 2004. 
34 For an excellent overview of many of these dimensions of the crisis, see Raftopoulos & Savage (2004),  
35 See ‘Zimbabwe’s missing millions’, Mail and Guardian (SA) , 4 December 2002. 
36 Solidarity Peace Trust, No War in Zimbabwe: An Account of the Exodus of a Nation’s People, Johannesburg: 
Solidarity Peace Trust, 2004. 
37 ‘Zimbabwe crisis spills over border’, BBC News, 31 March 2004. 
38  For different perspectives, see Ben Cousins, ‘The Zimbabwe Crisis in its Wider Context: The Politics of 
Land, Democracy and Development in Southern Africa’, in Hammar et al.(2003), pp.263-308; Phimister & 
Raftopoulos (2004); Sam Moyo, ‘The Politics of Land Distribution and Race Relations in Southern Africa’, 
Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper Number 10, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, 2004. 
39 See Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics’, in Raftopoulos & Savage (2004), 
pp. 160-175. 
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attempts to divide the world between a mainly black nationalist ‘us’ and a primarily 
white/Western (and black ‘sell-out’) ‘them’, and to mask his regime’s attacks on a black 
opposition, have gradually begun to be challenged by Africans in the region. The challenge 
has been led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), subsequently joined 
by the South African Communist Party (SACP) as well as church and human rights 
organisations. There have also been outspoken individual critics such as Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, as well as occasional popular support.40 Both COSATU 
and SACP are tripartite alliance partners in the ANC-led South African government, which 
has otherwise followed a path of ‘quiet diplomacy’ widely criticised for providing the 
Mugabe regime with ongoing support and legitimacy. 41   
 
 
In Search of ‘Normal Government’ 
Implicit in the critique of the ‘collapse’ of standard practices of government is a longing for 
the return of some kind of ‘normality’ to Zimbabwe. This has become a common refrain in 
everyday life. But what exactly is being longed for, and by whom? And what kinds of politics 
and practices are involved in constructing and naturalising the different ideas of normal 
government in Zimbabwe?42 What is evident is that the kind of normal government envisioned 
within a broadly liberal-democratic framework is not the same ‘normal’ being claimed and 
created through President Mugabe’s present political and economic projects, although there 
are certain overlaps and echoes between the two.43  
 
Within the liberal framework, normal government assumes a democratically elected, 
transparent and accountable ruling body that upholds the constitution and the rule of law, 
protects the independence of the judiciary, respects the independence of the media, sustains 
the professionalism of state agencies including the police and army, protects basic human 
rights, ensures all citizens equal security and protection under the law, and, most notably, 
protects private property and investments. Somewhere amidst all this, the state is also 
expected to provide public goods and services and deliver or facilitate economic growth and 
‘development’. While some appropriately caution against the idealisation of liberalism,44 
current longings for this ideal – expressed as much by those noticeably disadvantaged as 
privileged under pre-crisis conditions in Zimbabwe – denote nostalgia for a mythically stable 
situation prior to February 2000. Zimbabwe was not only already in economic and political 
decline long before this date, but the assumed rights and security inherent in this ideal were 
persistently unevenly applied. For example, hundreds of thousands of farm workers had long 
been on the receiving end of ‘illiberal’ practices;45 and the sacred cow of liberalism – namely 
private property – has itself been responsible for decades if not centuries of dispossession in 
both colonial and postcolonial states, as well as much earlier in European history. 46 
                                                 
40 See ‘Concerts, marches at Zim border’, Sapa, 13 March 2005.  
41 See Ian Phimister, ‘South African Diplomacy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe. Liberation Solidarity in the 21st 
Century’, in Raftopoulos & Savage (2004), pp.271-291. 
42 The varied practices involved in normalising government and the state are explored in rich ethnographic and 
theoretical detail in Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat (eds), States of Imagination. Ethnographic 
Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001. 
43 For a sense of these overlaps, see Eric Worby, ‘The End of Modernity in Zimbabwe? Passages from 
Development to Sovereignty’, in Hammar et al. (2003), pp.49-81.  
44 See, for example, Mitchell Dean, ‘“Demonic Societies”: Liberalism, Biopolitics, and Sovereignty’, in Hansen 
& Stepputat (2001), pp.45-64. 
45 Blair Rutherford, ‘Belonging to the Farm(er): Farm Workers, Farmers, and the Shifting Politics of 
Citizenship’, in Hammar et al. (2003), pp.191-216. 
46 E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common, New York: The New Press, 1991. 
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Certain ideals of liberalism formed the basis of the political compromises forged at the 
Lancaster House conference in 1979 that ended Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Many of these 
ideals were officially upheld as part of the assumed norm during the first two post-
independence decades. This was necessary to sustain Zimbabwe’s international credibility 
and ensure access to development aid and investment, albeit with the dubious advantage of 
leading to the adoption of structural adjustment policies in the 1990s. However, their actual 
application was patchy and erratic. In practice, liberal principles had to coexist within the 
same ideological and political space as the self-consciously non-liberal vision of rule of the 
then incumbent prime minister, now president, Robert Mugabe. Despite conceding to don the 
cloak of liberal democracy in the tense moments of transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe in 
1980, Mugabe’s Marxist-Leninist leanings were widely known. He expressed an explicit 
commitment to ending imperialist exploitation, reversing decades of colonial racist bias in 
economic and civic life, ensuring redistribution of wealth through more equitable ownership 
of natural resources, especially land, and more generally promoting participation in ownership 
of the economy by the state and (indigenous) nationals.47  
 
Mugabe’s speeches and writings in the early years, while largely conciliatory and pragmatic, 
were nonetheless explicit about a nationalist, socialist vision for Zimbabwe, one he has 
claimed he was forced to abandon by Britain, the former colonial power, but which he has 
since resurrected with religious zeal. The uneasy weave of ideologies this produced was 
evident in his foreword to the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) of 1982:  
 
The Plan […] recognises the existing phenomenon of capitalism as an historical 
reality, which […] has to be purposefully harnessed, regulated and transformed as 
a partner in the overall endeavour to achieve set national goals. Accordingly, 
while the main thrust of the Plan is socialist and calls for a greater role by the 
State through the instrumentality of State enterprises, worker participation, and 
socialist cooperation, ample room has been reserved for performance by private 
enterprise.48 
 
In addition to the proposed interweaving of these competing ideas, there was also the question 
of Zimbabwe’s (contested) history of traditional authority and customary laws that had to be 
worked into the new and evolving state’s policies and practices of government and 
development. This has been a dynamic process of continuous surges and retreats, reflecting a 
region-wide pattern. 
 
Establishing a one-party state was, and has remained, a key ambition and pillar of Mugabe’s 
philosophy of rule and his vision for the transformation of government since well before 
independence. Although frequently challenged, this project has underpinned some of his most 
overtly political policy reforms, such as decentralisation, 49 as well as his pattern of punishing 
political dissent. However, it suffered a blow in ideological credibility and political support 
after the collapse of Soviet communism at the end of the 1980s, which in turn unleashed a 
                                                 
47 Lawrence Tshuma, A Matter of (In)Justice: Law, State and the Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe, Harare: 
SAPES Books, 1997.  
48 Government of Zimbabwe,  Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83 – 1984/85, Harare: Government 
Printers, 1982. 
49 John Mw. Makumbe, Democracy and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints of Decentralisation, Harare: 
SAPES Books, 1998. 
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broad ‘wave of democratisation’ in Africa during the 1990s that was difficult to ignore.50 
Initially these new global conditions prompted various smokescreens in attempts to disguise 
Zanu (PF)’s ongoing drive towards a de facto one-party state. But with the emergence in 1999 
of the MDC as a politically viable opposition party, a new set of rules defining politics and 
the practices of government had to be constructed.  
 
For Mugabe and Zanu (PF) this has entailed a constant discursive reassembling of diverse 
regimes of truth and selective traditions, be these in the form of revolutionary nationalism, 
democracy, tradition, or various alternative visions of modernity. 51 Within this ever-changing 
kaleidoscope, one finds juxtaposed assertions by Mugabe and his spokespeople of holding 
free and fair elections and maintaining law and order (despite all evidence to the contrary), 
while portraying liberal democracy as a tool of Western imperialism and anathema to 
Zimbabwe’s historically legitimate land revolution. One has heard populist declarations that 
only the ‘deeply rural’, that is, those who adhere to their ‘traditional roots in the village’ and 
who are still in possession of their totems, can be considered ‘true’ citizens of Zimbabwe. At 
the same time, both actual war veterans from the liberation struggle of the 1970s, and the new 
Zanu (PF) youth militia, have been required to abandon alliances with their own historical 
traditions, namely their links to chiefs, kinship or locality, in favour of loyalty to Zanu (PF).52 
The promised reward has been their redefined status, along with a narrow political elite, as 
super-citizens. 
 
 
Normalising Violence and Reconstituting War Heroes  
In this strange landscape of smoke and mirrors, what has been witnessed is the production of 
the norm of violence; that is, the process by which violence – including the rapid spread of 
direct physical violence such as torture, rape, kidnapping, intimidation and sometimes 
murder, as well as a range of other forms of social, economic, emotional, cultural and sexual 
violence – has become normalised as an everyday mode of rule and technology of 
government. In the deliberate absence of official state intervention to protect its citizens from 
acts of violence, and in many cases the direct participation in such acts by state agents 
themselves, there has been a strategic move by the ruling party to decriminalise, and hence 
legitimise, violence against a specifically targeted yet abstract category of (non)citizens, 
namely opposition supporters.   
 
According to a recent biography of Robert Mugabe, violence has been a consistent personal 
creed of his. Martin Meredith quotes a radio broadcast in 1976 from Mozambique, at the 
height of the liberation war, during which Mugabe summed up his view of electoral 
democracy as follows:  
 
Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall 
have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain 
                                                 
50 Peter Geschiere & Josef Gugler, ‘Introduction. The Urban-Rural Connection: Changing Issues of Belonging 
and Identification’, Africa, 68:3 (1998), pp.309-319. 
51 Concerning Zimbabwe’s ‘contradictory terrain of development’, see Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The 
Terrain of Contradictory Development. Boulder: Westview, 1991. For nuanced reflections on the notion of 
alternative modernities, see Worby (2003). 
52 This was not uniformly so. As Alexander and McGregor note for Matabeleland, for example, locally based 
war veterans and Zanu (PF) militants were constrained by their links to familiar local networks. On the other 
hand, they and others cite examples of a Zanu (PF) strategy of importing outsiders to undertake acts of violence 
and terror. Jocelyn Alexander & JoAnn McGregor, ‘Elections, Land and the Politics of Opposition in 
Matabeleland’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 1:4 (2001), pp.510-533. 
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its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are 
always inseparable twins.53  
 
Meredith point s out that Mugabe and his close supporters have consistently used extremes of 
violence to overcome many of the political challenges they have faced, not only during the 
liberation struggle but also since independence in 1980.54 In the run-up to parliamentary 
elections in June 2000, Mugabe boasted of having “a degree in violence”, while a close 
political ally and minister in his cabinet, Nathan Shamuyarira, noted publicly that violence 
was an area where Zanu (PF) has had “a very strong, long and successful history”55.  
 
The ruling party’s references to a ‘successful’ history of violence have performed a double-act 
of memory work. On the one hand, the reference to the Second Chimurenga reaffirms the 
status of Zanu (PF) as the legitimate liberator of Zimbabwe from colonial rule, through ‘the 
gun’ (although in effect the enforced Lancaster House agreement in 1979 deprived Mugabe of 
an all-out military victory). At the same time, it is a coded reminder of the price of dissent to 
those who suffered brutally under Mugabe’s Korean-trained Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland 
and Midlands during the 1980s.56 It is not by chance that the state-supported land occupations, 
disruptions of local government institutions and of selected private businesses, and violent 
attacks on all forms of opposition including the independent media since 2000, have been 
defined within the same metaphorical code as the Third Chimurenga. Not only does this 
discursively locate the present moment along (or at the end of) a narrowly defined historical 
trajectory of (unfinished) struggle against colonial injustice – the final phase of national 
liberation – but quite pointedly locates it along a continuum of violent struggle, even ‘war’.57  
 
In December 2001, at the Zanu (PF) party congress, Mugabe extended the notion of war to 
include a national ‘war on terror’. This capitalised on the post-September 11 discourse on 
terror, much as other authoritarian states have done since then, to defy growing international 
criticism and further legitimise his anti-democratic practices. Artfully deflecting the evidence 
stacked against his own party, he accused the MDC of deliberately hatching “a campaign of 
violent intimidation” and of posing “a real terrorist threat to the country which will not be 
allowed to go unchecked”. 58 Further reinforcing this rhetoric, the cabinet sworn in August 
2002 was described by Mugabe as “a fully-fledged war council set up to fight the country’s 
economic problems”, and as “a political war cabinet which will take into account actions 
                                                 
53 Martin Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe, Oxford: Public 
Affairs, 2002, p.225.  
54 Besides the Gukurahundi state-led massacres of the 1980s, there are numerous examples of smaller-scale 
violence (including previous electoral violence and ongoing structural violence) used by the state against its own 
citizens since independence. See, for example, Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor & Terence Ranger, 
Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland, Oxford: James Currey, 2000.  
55 Cited in Meredith (2002), p 225. 
56 For analyses of this period see for example Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace/Legal Resources 
Foundation, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace. A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the 
Midlands 1980 to 1988, Harare, CCJP/LRF, 1997; Katri Pohjolianen Yap, Uprooting the Weeds. Power, 
Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict 1980-1987, unpublished PhD thesis, Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague, 2001; Alexander et al. (2000); Shari Eppel, ‘Gukurahundi: The Need for Truth and 
Reparation’, in Raftopoulos & Savage (2004), pp.43-62. 
57 As Kriger notes for the period up to 1987, “the ruling party’s impressive power had been built to a significant 
degree on violence, guerrilla privilege, and symbolic appeals to war”. Norma Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-
War Zimbabwe. Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 
p.187. 
58 Based on author’s personal transcript of Mugabe’s speech delivered at the Zanu (PF) party congress in 
Victoria Falls, 13 December 2002, broadcast live on Zimbabwe radio. 
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being taken by Britain and its allies against Zimbabwe”. 59 Such language and its 
(re)structuring effects on political, institutional and social practices, set the scene for a 
parallel, deadly politics of identity and belonging now at play. This is a politics that attempts 
to redefine those entitled to belong: to the land, as legitimate sons and daughters of the soil; to 
the state, as valid and loyal citizens; and to the nation, as either racially, ethnically or 
politically ‘pure’ insiders, set against an ever-expanding category of dangerous Others now 
tainting the national body. 60 This seems consistent with what Geschiere and Gugler observed 
elsewhere in Africa during the 1990s:  
Now that elections have real meaning again, the fear of being outvoted by 
‘strangers’ – whatever their origins or the precise definition of their otherness – 
has evoked an obsession with roots and origins.61 
 
In the present times in Zimbabwe, there has been a replacement of the more classic 
autochthony trope by a different and even narrower version of authenticity and insiderhood, 
that of liberation-war credentials.62 This has powerfully revalorised actual war veterans from 
the Second Chimurenga, whose growing disenchantment with the state and ruling party by the 
late 1990s was in urgent need of rechannelling into some kind of unifying ‘nationalist’ 
project.63 This was especially so after President Mugabe, in 1997, personally acceded to 
forceful demands for compensation and pensions by war veterans, who had mobilised 
themselves very effectively through the new and powerful Zimbabwe National Liberation 
War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). At a time of waning support for the party, these 
concessions bought Mugabe and Zanu (PF) a degree of loyalty from an important symbolic 
constituency, which they subsequently harnessed to great effect in their simultaneous 
campaigns to ‘destroy the world of the white farm’,64 crush the opposition, and reinvent the 
terms of rule and practices of government. But as McGregor observes, veterans “brought their 
own economic and political interests to the alliance, which have sometimes threatened central 
party control”. 65  
 
War veterans – who were part of two distinct liberation armies, Zanla and Zipra, attached to 
Zanu-PF and ZAPU respectively during the struggle – are far from being a seamless category 
of homogenous social actors sharing a common past or present. Their multiple differences in 
terms of class, gender, ethnicity, spatial origin, ideological orientation, and party and 
leadership affiliation, translated into different experiences of the liberation war itself, and also 
into differential levels of accumulation and marginalisation in the post- independence years.66 
According to McGregor, those in active alliance with Zanu (PF) “have been drawn 
overwhelmingly from the ranks of the unemployed or poorly remunerated, who lack 
                                                 
59 ‘Mugabe sees new cabinet as ‘war council’’, Financial Times (UK), 26 August 2002. 
60 For chilling echoes from elsewhere, see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
61 Geschiere & Gugler (1998), p.313. 
62Richard Werbner, ‘Smoke from the Barrel of a Gu n: Postwars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in 
Zimbabwe’, in Richard Werbner (ed.), Memory and the Postcolony. African Anthropology and the Critique of 
Power, London & New York: Zed Books, 1998, pp.71-102. 
63 However, war veterans who have become MDC supporters are no longer accorded this hero status. In the 
context of the Third Chimurenga they have been recast by Zanu (PF) as ‘sell outs’ and counter-revolutionary. 
Consequently they have been victimised by, among other things, being denied land in the new ‘fast track’ 
resettlement programme, while having their ex-combatants’ pension benefits terminated (see Zimbabwe 
Independent, 18 October 2002). 
64 See ‘Land reform a cover for Zanu war on opposition’, Business Day (SA), 23 August 2002. 
65 McGregor (2002), p.10.  See also Kriger (2003). 
66 Kriger (2003). 
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education and prospects”. 67 Yet it is primarily those from these same ranks who suffered the 
betrayal of the party, in many cases being neglected for months on the farms they dutifully 
invaded, but worse still, being evicted from these farms to make way for ‘private’ ownership 
by the party elite.68  
 
Not surprisingly, cracks began to appear in the political façade of the ZNWLVA. 69 Queried 
about alleged defections of some veterans from his organisation, the secretary-general, Andy 
Mhlanga, dismissed the allegations, asserting that “anyway, true war veterans remain loyal to 
Zanu PF and President Mugabe because we fought the liberation war together. It is a marriage 
for life”. 70 Yet it has been a rocky marriage. In early 2005, President Mugabe (illegally) fired 
the elected chairman of ZNWLVA, Jabulani Sibanda, apparently “after he complained that 
commercial farms seized from whites were being given to Mugabe’s cronies rather than to 
war veterans as promised”. However, there were also allegations of an alliance between 
Sibanda and Mugabe’s out-of- favour, and soon-to-be-dismissed former Minister of 
Information, Jonathan Moyo. The overall effect was that the ZNWLVA, “once the blunt 
instrument of Mugabe’s politics of intimidation who played a key role in the previous two 
elections”, during the 2005 election campaign was “nowhere to be seen”.71    
 
Echoing some of the tensions from earlier periods, internal differences between war veterans 
manifested themselves in organisational splits in 2000, for example with the setting up in May 
2000 of an alternative to the ZNLWVA, the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform for Peace and 
Development. As noted by Alexander and McGregor, those who formed this group explicitly 
distanced themselves from political violence and condemned the farm invasions. In addition, 
they “spoke out angrily against what they saw as the exploitation of veterans by a weak and 
unpopular party”. 72 Others became active members of the opposition MDC or joined smaller 
opposition parties. Such acts of ‘treachery’, in the logic of Zanu (PF), cancel out their war 
hero status and hence their political authenticity.  
 
Yet the potential loss by Zanu (PF) of a substantial proportion of its seemingly natural 
constituency was effectively countered by a strategic expansion of the category of war 
veterans. By defining the present ‘revolution’ as the Third Chimurenga, the party was able to 
reclassify the recently-formed Zanu (PF) youth militia as legitimate ‘war liberation’ heroes. 
This was confirmed by President Mugabe in his speech to mark Heroes Day in August 2002, 
in yet another shrewd reworking of the terms of his critics, in this case rebuffing those who 
queried the authenticity of ‘so-called’ war veterans spearheading ‘the land revolution’. While 
paying tribute to the past heroes of the country’s struggle for independence, the President 
noted that even those accused of being too young to have fought with the guerrilla forces were 
entitled to be called war veterans. After all, he noted, they were the new war veterans; not 
impostors but genuine fighters for their land. This representation allowed the regime to further 
legitimise them through their partial integration into the army in 2004, and in turn to use them 
to assist in ‘administering’ the 2005 parliamentary elections. 
 
                                                 
67 McGregor (2002), p.11. 
68 See ‘Government evicts resettled villagers to pave way for Shiri’, The Daily News, 18 September 2002; ‘Zanu 
PF moves to rein in war vets’, Daily Mirror (Zimb), 18 December 2004. 
69 In 2002, members of an alleged war veterans breakaway party, the New People’s Party (NPP), accused Zanu 
(PF) of  ‘forgetting’ them, leaving them out of the land redistribution exercise (‘War vets split from Zanu PF 
party’, The Standard , Sunday 14 July 2002). 
70 ‘War vets split from Zanu PF party’, The Standard , Sunday 14 July 2002. 
71 ‘A not-so-subtle rigging job’, Star (SA), 23 March 2005. 
72 Alexander & McGregor (2001), pp.514-515. 
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Traditional Authority and Partisan Politics 
In contrast to the attention given to the role played by war veterans, Zanu (PF) youth militia 
and state security agencies during the post-2000 crisis, there has been relatively little focus in 
the literature on the position and practices of traditional leaders. Historically there have been 
recurring ambivalences and contradictory policies by successive states, colonial and 
postcolonial, with regard to the role of traditional leaders within Zimbabwe’s system of 
governance.73 In the past two and a half decades, there have been alternating measures 
introduced to either undermine or revive the authority of traditional leaders. Measures to 
curtail especially the authority of chiefs and headmen over land allocation and the 
administration of local justice, characterised the immediate post- independence period when 
one of the key stated aims of the new state was to establish a more democratic, decentralised 
form of local government. Yet already by the mid-1980s, initially just prior to the 1985 
parliamentary elections, there were reversals of this trend, with concessions on control over 
community courts being made by then Prime Minister Mugabe.74 By the time of the Rural 
District Councils Act of 1988, chiefs were included (albeit as ex-officio members) in the 
anticipated new local councils.  
 
Measures to revalidate chiefly authority intensified especially during the second half of the 
1990s, as both state and ruling party legitimacy began to slip even in rural areas. Here, 
especially in the Communal Lands, customary laws (sanctioned formally by state legislation), 
and hence traditional leaders, continued to hold sway to varying degrees in different localities 
with respect to certain social, symbolic and material domains. They represented potential 
allies to support a waning party and state in recovering sovereignty at a very crucial time. 
This, far more than any substantial pressure from an organised traditionalist lobby – largely 
absent in Zimbabwe, unlike that in South Africa75 – led to the passing of the Traditional 
Leaders Act in 1998. While the Act sustained a level of ambivalence over such key domains 
as land allocation authority – to be undertaken ‘in consultation’ with the Rural District 
Councils – it nonetheless implied a stronger official validation of the authority of traditional 
leaders. This intensified in the post-2000 period as the opposition challenge to Zanu (PF) 
from the newly-formed MDC grew. In response, the ruling party began to recruit not only 
new ‘soldiers’ (youth militia, in addition to war veterans) in its war against the opposition 
(represented publicly as a war against colonia lism and imperialism), but equally began to 
draw on both the symbolic and territorial authority of an old guard, namely chiefs and 
headmen.  
 
                                                 
73 For pre -independence periods, see, for example,  Terence Ranger, ‘Democracy and Traditional Political 
Structures in Zimbabwe, 1890-1999’, in Ngwabi Bhebhe & Terence Ranger (eds), The Historical Dimensions of 
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War Conflict in Zimbabwe’s Rural Areas’, in N. Bhebe & T. O. Ranger (eds), Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation 
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While there was initially less involvement by traditional leaders in explicitly partisan acts of 
violence or intimidation, by at least early 2004 reports began appearing of a more active role 
being taken by some chiefs and headmen in various parliamentary by-election activities. In 
February 2004 in Gutu District, Masvingo Province, some chiefs and headmen were reported 
to have been actively campaigning for ruling party candidates. They were said to have 
‘banned’ the MDC from campaigning in their areas, and additionally to have been physically 
present at polling stations checking names of voters and intimidating them to vote for the 
ruling party. One villager was quoted as saying: “The chief told us that if we didn’t vote for 
Zanu PF we would be evicted from our homesteads”. In the same article, a chief who spoke 
on condition of anonymity informed reporters that Zanu (PF) officials and the local war 
veterans’ leadership had warned them that “we would be stripped of our titles and allowances 
if people in our areas voted for the opposition”. 76 The electoral ‘success’ of these tactics in 
Gutu inspired the ruling party to employ them again just a month later in another by-election 
in Lupane District in Matabeleland North. 77 
 
Such practices were actively extended across the country in the build-up to the March 2005 
parliamentary elections, with evidence of many chiefs and headmen taking on explicitly 
partisan roles in forcing constituents to attend Zanu (PF) rallies and vote for the ruling party.78 
In the northern town of Hurungwe in Mashonaland West, the MDC named chiefs who they 
claimed had tried to block an opposition campaign rally, and had threatened to evict residents 
who voted for the opposition and to deny them agricultural aid. In the same area, the new 
Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, was quoted as announcing at public rallies that chiefs and other 
traditional leaders “should shepherd their subjects to polling stations on voting day” to ensure 
that they cast their ballots.79 Some villagers experiencing such threats from their traditional 
leaders explained this in terms of the regime having provided chiefs and headmen in recent 
years with increased salaries, vehicles and in some cases land.80 In addition, of the thirty 
parliamentary seats that President Mugabe can appoint directly, ten of these are reserved for 
chiefs. However, responding to the allegations that chiefs were forcing their people to attend 
Zanu (PF) rallies and vote for the ruling party, the Interior Minister, Kembo Mohadi, asserted:  
Ours is a peaceful party. Our people hold their chiefs in high regard and, 
naturally, [we] get worried when such accusations are made against them. We 
cannot deny our people the right to choose their own leaders when we fought so 
hard [during the liberation struggle] to bring them human rights, freedom and 
social justice.  
Those organisations alleging violence and human rights abuses by the ruling party and their 
allies, he argued, were “subversives who are western-funded”. 81  
 
Particularly disturbing were reports of some chiefs and headmen threatening starvation to 
their own communities if they supported the opposition, echoing a much wider practice of the 
use of food as a political weapon by Zanu (PF).82 These were far from idle threats, particularly 
under conditions of extreme hunger when over half of Zimbabwe’s population were estimated 
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to be in need of (scarcely available) food aid, and  international food agencies had been barred 
from the country. Alongside Zanu (PF)’s absolute control over trade and the distribution of 
subsidized maize through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), chiefs became critical 
gatekeepers for accessing such grain: 
 
To be allowed to buy cheaper-priced maize from the government's Grain 
Marketing Board, starving villagers must be on a food assistance register kept by 
the chief. Chiefs also issue letters authorising the GMB to sell maize to their 
subjects…According to opposition officials, chiefs in Tsholotsho, Umzingwane, 
Insiza and other constituencies in the province have told their subjects to attend 
Zanu PF campaign rallies only, with those who defy the order or attend MDC 
rallies being removed from the food register.83 
 
The increasingly explicit alliance between traditional leaders and the ruling party prompted 
Zanu (PF) to arrange for youth militia to act as security guards to protect them in Midlands 
and the two Matabeleland provinces in late 2004. This is somewhat unprecedented, certainly 
in post-independence Zimbabwe. As one media report noted, “Chiefs have traditionally never 
required protection from their subjects”. 84 But the need for such guards may have been less 
about any real threat to the safety of these leaders and more related to Zanu (PF)’s attempts to 
have chiefs and headmen identified as its allies in rural areas, but also to give the impression 
of the MDC as violent and threatening. But while there were few if any reported cases of 
opposition attacks on pro-Zanu (PF) chiefs and headmen, there were several reports of violent 
attacks on traditional leaders viewed as sympathetic to the MDC.85  
 
Yet beyond what this explicitly partisan alliance between traditional leaders and the ruling 
party means in the immediate sense – in terms of political intimidation through threats of 
expulsion and starvation – it raises broader questions about changing modes of rule in 
Zimbabwe under present conditions of crisis and its implications for democracy. Clearly, one 
cannot ignore the continuing if uneven significance of traditional authorities in various parts 
of Africa, and not only in rural contexts,86 nor in isolation from a range of other key 
institutions and processes. As Alexander has noted:  
Chieftaincy is of particular interest because its fate is intertwined with those of 
other local authorities, with socio-economic and political change and with the 
goals of governments.87  
 
One might also wonder to what extent the cooptation of traditional leaders by Zanu (PF) into 
its current political project reflects claims of ‘re-traditionalisation’ in many parts of Africa.88 
Certainly, such cyclical practices are not new on the continent. As already noted, there is a 
long history of dynamic, contradictory and contested relationships between governments and 
traditional authorities in southern Africa, much of which has depended on tactical 
perpetuations (from both sides) of the discursive dichotomy between ‘tradition’ and 
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‘modernity’, even where this has long ceased to be valid in practice.89 However, this history 
does not detract from the importance of tracing the specific ways in which these relationships 
are being played out in contemporary African settings, and of reflecting on the critical 
challenges this poses for ‘democratic consolidation’.90  For the moment though, this paper 
focuses more on the militarisation of rule during the present crisis, and specifically on the 
disruption of local government by war veterans and others. 
 
 
Tensions in the Terms of Rule 
In the context of growing militarisation in almost all aspects of political, economic and social 
life in Zimbabwe, one might be tempted to conclude that Mugabe and Zanu (PF) have shifted 
away from using ‘power’ as the basis of rule –  in the Foucauldian sense of governing by 
‘acting upon the actions of others’, which requires the freedom of its governed subjects – and 
replaced it with ‘domination’, which requires force against subjects who refuse to be 
governed.  Ironically, under the former Rhodesian regime, the present war veterans were the 
archetypal ungovernable subjects, overtly resisting settler-colonial domination. Now these 
same subjects have been reworked by the present postcolonial regime, albeit in an elastic 
version that incorporates the youth militia, to provoke and empower them to crush a new 
category of ungovernable subjects: ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’ in Mamdani’s terms;91 those 
constituting a real or imagined political threat to the ruling party.  
 
Yet there are very few conditions under which absolute domination is possible, or easily 
sustained. With reference to – but moving beyond – Foucault, Dean argues that “the exercise 
of government in all modern states entails the articulation of a form of pastoral power with 
one of sovereign power”.92 Here, pastoral power, or biopolitics, describes a politics and 
practice of government concerned with the ‘administration of life’. It works at the level of 
‘the population’, through measurable phenomena such as health status, sanitation, birth-rate, 
mortality, environment, race, genetics, housing, levels of employment, patterns of migration, 
standard of living, and so on. Sovereignty, on the other hand, “is characterised by a power of 
life and death”, having as its main instruments “laws, decrees, and regulations backed up by 
coercive sanctions ultimately grounded in the right of death exercised by the sovereign”. 93 All 
modes of rule, argues Dean, be they liberal or authoritarian, are compelled to address both 
biopolitics and sovereign power. What distinguishes modes from each other is the distinctive 
way in which they assemble and apply this combination of elements, some more concerned 
with the use of power to foster life, others to deny it. 
 
According to such an approach, President Mugabe would ultimately be constrained in his 
attempts to construct a new normality of rule and government in Zimbabwe based purely on 
assertions of sovereignty. Rather he would have to conjure up an image of the caring 
sovereign, concerned as much with the pastoral care of his subjects as with sustaining 
discipline and domination through force. Indeed, this is an intrinsic part of his rhetoric of 
restoring the lost lands through a ‘land revolution’. By reinventing the legitimate forms and 
spaces of citizenship – by renaming (as internal ‘enemies’) those subjects no longer entitled to 
pastoral care – he might go some way towards reducing such constraints on his expressions of 
                                                 
89 Alexander (2001).  
90 Beall (2005). 
91 Mamdani (2001). 
92 Dean (2001). 
93 Dean (2001), pp.47-49. 
 17
sovereign power, but he can never entirely eliminate them. Yet unlike the sovereign or the 
state (including the police and security services to some extent), militant war veterans, in their 
present (partial) constitution as the vanguard of ‘the revolution’, are not bound by the 
demands of pastoral care, at least not in the short term. As such, their initial work has been 
that of disruption, disorder and domination. Specifically in relation to rural local government 
institutions such as Rural District Councils, schools and clinics, it has been the work of 
violently undermining the existing mechanisms and processes through which biopolitics – the 
‘politics of life’ – have so far been constituted and practiced. But will this localised mode of 
rule-by-force persist, or will war veterans eventually be confronted with local, national or 
even international pressures that alter the new terms of rule they appear to be setting?  
 
This partly depends on what constitute the underlying projects and powers of the war veterans 
themselves. Are they (alongside their younger militia counterparts, and to a lesser extent 
chiefs and headmen) mere pawns in a partisan project of anarchic destruction on behalf of 
Zanu (PF), aimed at eliminating the presence of the opposition in key nodes of governmental 
power? Does their involvement have certain ‘revolutionary’ qualities in terms of genuine 
attempts at transforming the direction, framework and practices of postcolonial rule? To what 
extent does their extensive disruption of the multiple spaces and practices of government, as 
previously identified by The Daily News article, constitute ‘government by war veterans’? 
What defines the limits of their interventions, and what will be their longer-term effects on the 
sphere of local government, and on their own political status and future trajectory? It is with 
these kinds of questions in mind that the remainder of this paper considers the significance of 
local government and its present disruption by war veterans. Why, in addition to the other key 
targets of attack since February 2000 – the commercial farms, but also businesses, the 
judiciary, non-governmental organisations, the independent media, and opposition party 
structures and individuals – have local authorities and associated institutions been so violently 
disrupted? What is fundamentally at stake in the current struggles over, and within, local 
government in Zimbabwe?  
 
 
The Making of Rural Local Government 
Rural local government is a particularly significant if somewhat ambivalent arena of public 
authority, being in many ways at the frontier of state sovereignty and ruling party hegemony, 
while equally being engaged with the specific dynamics of local politics. As a concept, local 
government denotes simultaneously a space and a mode of rule. On the one hand, it implies a 
distinction from central or national government, represented as a ‘lower-tier’ of government. 
This is often reflected in organograms and other institutional mapping technologies whose 
boxes, circles and arrows on a page confidently assert well defined administrative boundaries 
and clear linear hierarchies of bureaucratic authority and accountability. Similarly, formal 
flows (or absences) of public finance between ‘levels’ of government confirm patterns of 
power within this framework. Such symbolic borders are frequently challenged by the actual 
mobilities of bodies, resources and ideas.94 Nonetheless, the discursive definition of 
administrative boundaries has very concrete material effects, not least in terms of the actual 
distribution and control of public funds, or the delegation or devolution of various functions 
and forms of authority (over land, justice, security, movement, even citizenship) that impact 
in numerous ways on the everyday lives of ordinary citizens.  
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At the same time, images of local government as a specifically ‘local’ form of rule give the 
impression of immediacy and accessibility; of mutual legibility – perhaps even intimacy – 
between an otherwise distant (and apparently distinct) state and ‘its’ citizenry. Much of the 
rhetoric and policies associated with local government reform in Africa, especially 
decentralisation policies, in addition to their modernist claims to improving efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability in the delivery of public goods and services, often include a 
commitment to enhance participatory planning or even democracy by ‘bringing government 
closer to the people’. As is most often the case, this promise, and the varied responses of 
citizens, is more than a little double-edged. 
 
At independence, Zimbabwe’s newly elected government was faced with an immense task of 
reconstruction and reinvention on all levels. With regard to rural local government, there were 
two parallel yet related projects to address, both inherently connected to ongoing processes of 
state making and securing ruling party hegemony. Firstly, there was the problem of 
‘development’, especially in the Communal Lands which had suffered most through the many 
decades of colonial underdevelopment. These were followed by the years of the liberation war 
that left infrastructure devastated and rural development administration depleted or entirely 
destroyed in some areas,95 and where popular expectations were especially high.  Secondly, 
there was the problem of creating and legitimising a new order, through establishing new or 
reformed institutions and practices of local government. However, these projects were not 
starting in a vacuum. Not only did the new regime have to contend with the continuities of 
inherited colonial structures, personnel and practices, but also those generated in the 
countryside by the nationalist movements and armies under conditions of war.96  
 
It had been clear to many nationalists during colonial rule that gaining control of and 
changing the institutions, policies and procedures of local government was an essential step in 
national liberation. At the height of the war in the late 1970s, rural local government for black 
Africans in the racially defined Tribal Trust Lands consisted of several hundred 
geographically fragmented and very poorly resourced African Councils which were almost 
entirely dependent on – and subservient to – central government. These African Councils 
were interpreted by nationalists as a symbol of enforced separate development and civic 
exclusion, and their rejection became part of the emerging nationalist discourse. As the 
movement for national liberation escalated into an armed struggle in the early 1970s, the 
disruption if not destruction of these councils became an explicit objective of the guerrilla 
armies. Council offices and other local government infrastructure, including schools, were 
targeted throughout the war. According to former Provincial Governor of Midlands Province, 
“out of the 242 African Councils that existed in the mid-70s, only 22 were operating by 
independence in 1980”.97   
 
At the same time, with many chiefs moving to urban areas for the duration of the liberation 
war – often facing suspicions and attacks themselves by both sides fighting the war for their 
assumed or actual collaborations – a political and institutional vacuum was being created in 
the countryside, which the guerrilla ‘comrades’ and their rural supporters attempted to fill 
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with alternative structures of governance.98 In effect, these were local party committees and 
cells that were critical to supporting a bush-based guerrilla struggle, but whose authoritarian 
practices would partly pervade future rural local institutions and politics.99 However, 
according to the former Governor of Midlands, the vision for these structures – which were 
expected to be based on elected representatives – was that they would provide for a 
combination of “development, security and democracy” in a newly liberated Zimbabwe.100   
 
A whole flurry of policies and programmes were introduced soon after independence to 
address the most pressing administrative and political challenges in the local government 
system, with the more economic and social aspects constantly lagging behind.101 The District 
Councils Act of 1980 primarily tackled the problem of fragmentation of African Councils, 
facilitating their consolidation from over two hundred to fifty-five ‘more viable’ District 
Councils. However, these remained severely marginalised, under-resourced and dependent on 
central government. The Act was also instrumental in formally stripping chiefs and headmen 
of both their judicial and land allocation powers. This was a symbolic political act, which did 
not translate evenly into altered local governance practices but rather deepened the 
ambiguities in localised authority that have persisted since independence. Subsequent 
directives, legislation and policies in the mid-1980s focused more specifically on 
decentralisation. In combination, these measures detailed the new local government hierarchy, 
including the composition and functions of councils and committees from village to ward to 
district to provincial levels.102 In addition, they established a comprehensive range of local 
government cadres to operate the system. On the one hand, there were elected members of 
Village and Ward Development Committees, and ward councillors who constituted the 
elected membership of the District Council. On the other hand, there were central 
government-employed Village Community Workers (VCWs), Local Government Promotion 
Officers (LGPOs), District Administrators (DAs), and the various deconcentrated departments 
of central government ministries.  
 
In principle, in terms of administrative (re)form and practice, these changes were geared 
towards altering the size and boundaries of villages and wards, introducing ‘integrated and 
coordinated’ rural development planning, and facilitating ‘popular participation’. These were 
consistent with both the post- independence rhetoric of state-building on new terms, and the 
dominant developmentalist discourse of the 1980s reflecting a global consensus in ‘good 
governance’.103 Within the bureaucracy itself, a strong public administration ethos and 
professionalism characterised many of those responsible for designing and implementing the 
relevant policies and procedures.104 At the same time, one has to take seriously Makumbe’s 
assertion that “the decentralisation structure was primarily conceived for the purposes of 
creating the one-party state”. 105 Brand suggests that there was “deliberate (con)fusion of 
political and administrative structures at the district and local level”, signalling “an important 
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step towards the one-party state”. 106 In addition, he observed that the “various administrative 
tiers of decentralisation were explicitly designed to parallel those of the party structures”. 107 
Village and Ward Development Committees, for example, bore a close resemblance to former 
village- and ward- level party structures.  
 
The post of LGPO, a key frontline field worker, was filled with recently demobilised political 
commissars from the liberation armies, bringing not only valuable political mobilisation 
experience from the war to the project of ‘development’, but enhancing the revolutionary 
credentials of the new government. These posts did not last the decade, giving way instead to 
the more technocratic sensibilities and recentralising tendencies within the bureaucracy. 
However, the initial shift from liberation struggle to regular public administration at 
independence posed some interesting and awkward challenges for local government. As one 
former Permanent Secretary for Local Government observed just a year before the land 
occupations and local government disruptions of the current crisis began:   
 
In 1980, when we started, we were administering with the emphasis on power. 
The rationale was that it was a government system that came about through a war 
situation, and so a military type of approach was in place. It derived from the 
Party. The threat to the newly-won independence through hostile forces, both 
external and internal, required government institutions that would demonstrate 
change.... If you’re dealing with a power situation you have to use power to 
reverse it. We’ve developed since then. The manner in which I was running my 
office has changed. I’m looking now at a system conscious of people’s rights. 
There were no people’s rights before.108  
   
Towards the late 1980s, the emphasis of decentralisation policies was primarily on creating a 
unified rural local government system, through amalgamating the existing Rural Councils that 
served mainly white Large Scale Commercial Farming Areas, and the still under-resourced 
District Councils serving mainly the Communal Lands. The ongoing split reflected the 
government’s retention of two distinct rural property regimes – communal and freehold – 
which, as William Munro argues, not only accepted the “different concepts of rights that 
accrued to those regimes”, but equally “underwrote different conceptions of social being and 
citizenship” that had a direct bearing on the practices and politics of local government.109 Yet 
even if the retention of a private property regime (for the first post- independence decade) was 
one of the conditions of the Lancaster House constitution, there is little to suggest that had it 
not been so there would have been any substantive merging of the two tenure systems or any 
serious attempt to reform or reverse the communal tenure system. Both the 1994 Land Tenure 
Commission report, and the 1998 Land Reform and Resettlement Policy proposals (neither of 
which were actually implemented), underscored the positive value of retaining various 
‘traditional’ structures inherent in such a system. In many ways, perpetuating the communal 
lands – with its numerous ambiguities in relation to both land and authority – has allowed 
sustained political leverage and control by the party-state over a large majority of 
Zimbabweans. This has been well demonstrated in recent years. Yet while the bifurcated 
tenure regime and overall agrarian structure was to remain in place, the Rural District 
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Councils Act was passed in 1988 to facilitate institutional and political amalgamation of the 
councils. Among other things, it was designed (technocratically) to enhance autonomy and 
devolve powers and resources from central government agencies to the new local authorities.  
 
It took five years before the actual amalgamation was implemented, a period during which 
there was intense debate, experimentation and negotiation within government itself 
concerning the meanings and modes of decentralisation. Both the amalgamation process 
itself, and the deepening of decentralisation, raised fears and objections in many quarters. The 
resistance was not only from the mainly white and relatively well- to-do Rural Councils afraid 
of merging with black, under-resourced District Councils, but equally from various line 
ministries anticipating the loss of control over personnel and resources. In addition, there 
were tensions in the ‘parent’ ministry responsible for implementing the RDC Act, the then 
Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, emanating not least from the 
uncertainties and ‘demotion’ faced by District Administrators (DAs), who had until then been 
de facto Chief Executive Officers of the District Councils.  
 
With a worsening economic crisis by the end of the 1980s and the growing hegemony of neo-
liberalism, in 1991 the government introduced standard economic structural reforms. 
Decentralisation had become an important component of associated public sector reforms 
being promoted by the World Bank and other donors, and the push towards implementing the 
RDC Act was thus intensified. Consequently there was fairly robust financial support during 
the early-  and mid-1990s for a range of local government policy-development and capacity-
building initiatives. Eventually, then, the new unified rural local government system came 
into being, and in 1993 the first Rural District Council elections were held. The process of 
amalgamation was inevitably messy and complicated, a fact acknowledged by all parties and 
accepted as the basis of a conscious ‘learning by doing’ approach to capacity building. It 
nonetheless signified a moment of great optimism, at least in official spaces, especially for 
more efficient and effective delivery of services. At the time, there was an unusually high 
level of political commitment to the process expressed in the upper echelons of government. 
Both a Cabinet Committee on Decentralisation and a special committee of Permanent 
Secretaries were formed in the mid-1990s to ‘guide’ and give political weight to the 
decentralisation process. 
 
 
The Unma(s)king of Local Government  
Yet the reality for many of the new RDCs, especially those in the rural margins, was that they 
were assuming their authority at a moment of national economic decline, reduction in public 
sector spend ing, and growing popular discontent with government in general. The increasing 
pressure on RDCs to generate local revenue for their own administration and local 
development activities placed severe strains on them, 110 and in some cases brought them into 
direct competition and often outright conflict with their constituencies,111 arguably reflecting 
the tension between sovereignty and biopolitics.  
 
In addition to the revenue dilemma facing RDCs, there was a growing unease around the 
question of authority itself. Local political tensions mushroomed as the ruling party’s 
hegemony waned and it feared losing its grip on local councils long dominated by Zanu (PF). 
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Where Zanu (PF) local officials, including those elected as district councillors, exhibited 
questionable loyalty to the party, efforts were made to have them removed from their posts 
and to have them replaced by the party’s preferred (but unelected) candidates.112 This was not 
much different from practices in the 1980s, especially in Matabeleland where, in certain local 
council elections, the ruling party sometimes went to great lengths to impose its own 
candidates on the electorate in order to counter opposition from ZAPU. 113 Such practices were 
justified by a senior government minister and then Secretary General of Zanu-PF, the late 
Maurice Nyagumbo, in the following terms: “Ever since elections started, Zanu has won 
straight out. You can’t have two bulls in a kraal”. 114 
 
But there were also direct challenges to RDCs and to the state from ordinary citizens. 
Recounting the tale of her community’s forced eviction by the Gokwe North Rural District 
Council at a public gathering in 1999, and reaching a crescendo of exasperation at the violent 
betrayal exhibited by the RDC, one woman evictee demanded to know “where does the 
council get its power”. This overt questioning of rule – this refusal by conscious citizens to be 
governed solely on the RDC’s terms – underscored the persistent yet paradoxical struggle 
between the making and unmaking of local government. One of the key paradoxes of 
decentralisation in particular is its parallel role in both discipline and democracy. As Hansen 
has noted for India, while democracy was envisaged and promoted through greater 
decentralisation of local government, this same process in fact facilitated a channel for greater 
control and discipline of populations.115 Scott suggests that while decentralisation enhances 
the legibility (and hence susceptibility) of populations, it equally expands the opportunities 
for people to pressurise the developmental state to actually deliver ‘development’.116 More 
than that, it is often a battleground for contestations over authority, and over definitions of 
citizenship and the obligations, rights and resources associated with it. 
 
Yet whatever democratic principles and visions of local government were espoused within the 
official framework of decentralisation reforms during earlier decades, since 2000 they have 
been largely abandoned in practice in favour of an overtly partisan project of domination and 
control of Rural District Councils by Zanu (PF). This has occurred not only through 
disruption and occupation by loyalist war veterans and later also by party youth militia 
(known as ‘green bombers’), but in collaboration with the party leadership and the 
bureaucracy itself.117 One might note, for example, the intimidatory remarks made by 
Zimbabwe’s Vice President Joseph Msika at the biennial conference of the Association of 
Rural District Councils (ARDC) in July 2001, when “stunned officials” attending the meeting 
were “ordered …to openly declare their support for President Mugabe by a show of hands”:  
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‘Those of you who support him must raise your hands’, Msika said to deafening 
silence from the hundreds of delegates attending the third biennial congress of the 
Association of Rural District Councils. He then challenged those who do not 
support the President to also identify themselves, saying Zimbabwe would never 
have another Mugabe. Almost immediately afterwards, the delegates raised their 
hands to pledge their support for Mugabe.118  
 
The ARDC initially rejected this type of political interference, but such an explicitly critical 
stance was rapidly curtailed, and more general commentary by the ARDC on the extensive 
council disruptions has since been muted. This is despite the fact that the very survival of 
RDCs has been substantially threatened in several ways: their human resource capacity; their 
revenue base, for example from unit taxes in commercial farming areas and from wildlife 
tourism in marginal agricultural areas; their ability to deliver services; or their hold over their 
legislated authority, including land allocation authority ‘in consultation’ with traditional 
leaders.  
 
The response to war veterans’ interference by councils themselves varied. Those 
demonstrating direct support for the opposition MDC, or more specifically where MDC 
candidates were voted in as councillors, paid a severe price in terms of the extent and degree 
of violence involved in attacks both before and after elections.119 However, as noted 
specifically for Matabeleland North, some RDCs tried to resist through council resolutions to 
reinstate officials and councillors, or by demoting the council chairman who was seen as 
being ‘too close to the war veterans’.120 But given the high levels of support for the war 
veterans’ actions by the party and bureaucracy, ultimately ‘accommodations had to be made’. 
Both RDCs and District and Provincial Administrators (DAs and PAs) were forced to: 
take the war veterans’ demands seriously, even though the demands were illegal, 
circumvented existing channels for presenting complaints and ignored procedures 
for dismissing and recruiting public servants.121  
In addition, the growing conflation of party and state roles played by DAs and PAs, especially 
in relation to the new land committees and implementing the ‘fast track’ resettlement 
programme, produced even greater ‘confusion of authority’ at district and provincial levels. 
 
It was more difficult for Zanu (PF) and war veterans to sustain overt disruption of the mainly 
MDC-dominated urban local authorities, although violent attacks have taken place there 
too.122 However, verbal attacks and ministerial interference by the Minister of Local 
Government, Public Works and National Housing, Ignatius Chombo, have become legend.123 
In one widely publicised case, Harare City Council’s strenuous efforts to counter corruption 
and inefficiency were repeatedly undermined by the minister’s intervention on partisan 
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grounds.124 This contrasted sharply with the complete lack of protection provided by the state 
to large numbers of government employees attacked for allegedly supporting the MDC. These 
included staff in local government institutions throughout the country, as well as ‘dissident’ 
central government employees and chiefs and headmen, subjected to countless acts of 
intimidation, humiliation and violence, in some cases murder, allegedly at the hands of known 
Zanu (PF) militants.  
 
The attacks on rural school teachers, viewed by Zanu (PF) as a key constituency of the MDC, 
were particularly extensive and severe. Thousands of acts of violence and intimidation against 
teachers have been recorded since 2000. Abductions, torture, beatings, murder, intimidation, 
illegal dismissals and extortion for ‘protection’, have all been reported, with little if any 
response from the relevant ministries, the Public Service Commission, or the police. 
Thousands of teachers have been forced to flee their posts. Much as elsewhere, teachers 
constitute perhaps the largest group of decentralised local government employees. As such, 
they are important “bearers of the designs of the state”, 125 acting as frontline workers in the 
formation of subject-citizens. Despite their sometimes ambiguous position in rural 
communities – being at times highly respected for their knowledge and at others resented as 
arrogant outsiders – they nonetheless occupy a potentially influential position in relation to 
both current and future generations of voters, a fact not lost on any political party. In addition, 
the rural school itself is “an emblem that demarcates the territory effectively governed by the 
state, an institution that relays ideas about state, nation, and citizen”. 126 In rural Zimbabwe, 
with few brick-built structures, it also acts as a multi-purpose community centre. Occupation 
of these spaces by Zanu (PF) supporters – and especially the youth militia – further limited 
the capacity of the MDC to campaign, or independent civic organisations to hold meetings. In 
addition, schools often act as important feeding centres in times of drought. In the context of 
an impending famine in late 2002 and again in 2005, the removal of ‘opposition’ teachers 
would allow the ruling party even more control over the political distribution of food for 
millions of Zimbabweans. 
 
With regard to Rural District Council elections at the end of September 2002, the 
intimidations and terror campaigns were persistent and widespread, and explicitly targeted at 
MDC candidates. With less than one month to go before the elections, in one province alone, 
Midlands South, at least 36 MDC candidates had reportedly withdrawn, “fearing for their 
lives after being threatened with violence by Zanu PF supporters”. 127 In Chegutu District in 
Mashonaland West, eight out of eleven MDC candidates attempting to register their 
nominations were chased away by Zanu (PF) youths, while MDC officials assisting them 
were allegedly assaulted or detained, “in the presence of the police”. 128 In Manicaland and 
Masvingo, the police allegedly assisted in both the intimidation and false arrest of MDC 
candidates to prevent them from standing in the elections.129 Elsewhere, police in uniform 
were said to have directly participated in assaulting MDC candidates and supporters. 
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Recapturing the frontiers of rule, in which rural local government is key, has been a central 
project of Zanu (PF) since independence, just as it was a key goal of the liberation forces 
fighting colonial rule. At first this was about the newly independent government countering 
‘the spreading tentacles’ of the former settler-colonial state with its own territorialising 
practices. This was, and continues to be, an attempt by the postcolonial state to mark itself in 
ways that deepen both its physical and its imagined presence, and that extend the authority of 
its varied and often ambiguous agents through their access to and control over natural 
resources and human populations. However, the present drive to reoccupy these frontiers is 
portrayed by Zanu (PF) as part of the new war against recolonisation by whites and the West 
through their so-called proxy agent, the MDC. For the ruling party, party militants in general 
and war veterans in particular are not only critical of its broader hegemonic strategy, but 
equally of its attempts to recapture the space of local government.  
 
 
War Veterans: New Gatekeepers at the Frontiers of Government? 
McGregor has provided rich empirical detail and historically grounded analysis of war 
veterans’ systematic disruption of the institutions and independence of rural local authorities 
in the immediate crisis period.130 Together with anecdotal evidence sourced from media 
reports and personal testimonies from across the country, the emerging pattern includes at 
least the following: illegal dismissal or ‘chasing away’ of council employees, councillors, and  
even central government employees accused of supporting the MDC, and in some cases their 
replacement by war veterans; death threats and cases of alleged assault and even murder of 
suspected MDC supporters among council staff, teachers, and traditional leaders; physical 
closure, occupation and in some cases destruction of council offices and property; removal of 
council vehicles; disruption of council meetings and routine operations; control over land 
distribution lists; and violent disruption of council elections. What becomes evident here is 
that when the disruptions first began, there was already a context, albeit spatially and 
historically varied, of popular dissatisfaction with some councils and ‘genuine grievances’ 
which war veterans could draw on to legitimise their actions.  
 
Despite years of investment in RDC capacity building and capital development initiatives, the 
tide of post-amalgamation pressures on the RDCs had clearly been impossible to contain or 
counter. Policies and practices were adopted that seemed to exacerbate corruption and 
inefficiency in councils rather than curtail them, and this had already prompted interventions 
by the Ministry of Local Government that consistently undercut the spirit if not the word of 
the RDC Act. Yet even if there were serious problems in the RDCs that needed addressing, it 
appears that the combined and cumulative disruptions by war veterans, the central state and 
the ruling party have by no means resolved these. Instead, the overall effect of ‘the politics of 
disorder’ has been to exacerbate the councils’ problems. In the short term, experienced 
personnel have been forcibly removed and replaced with unqualified party loyalists, many 
routine council procedures have been interrupted, clinics and schools have been closed, 
revenues have been lost from unit taxes, forestry, tourism ventures and former donor-funded 
development projects, and there has been ongoing violence and a menacing atmosphere of 
fear.131  
 
According to McGregor, the long-term consequences are ‘potentially devastating’: 
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Corruption and cynicism have become pervasive, professionalism has been 
undermined, local authorities have been forced to respond to an authoritarian 
centre and its local agents, and public confidence in the local state may be 
difficult to win back. The goal of decentralized, accountable local state bodies 
seems further away than ever.132 
 
There is no underestimating such effects. Nor can one underestimate the success of Zanu (PF) 
in its determined efforts to reconquer the sphere of local government in general and colonise 
Rural District Councils in particular, at least for the moment. But there are several factors that 
will necessarily temper these moves in the long run. To begin with, local government, like the 
state, is in a continuous process of formation through its multiple articulations with different 
actors, processes and politics. In this sense, one cannot view RDCs as ‘empty vessels’ devoid 
of their own agency, merely open to external invasion or manipulation. The same applies to 
traditional leaders. There is a far more complex ‘micropolitics of locality’ that makes such 
external interventions contingent, and constrains the pace, scope, and direction of local- level 
political change.133 In fact the intensely and violently contested RDC elections in September 
2002 were evidence of how seriously all political players take the question of control over 
local government. 
 
Overlaying the politics of locality associated with the disruption of local government is a 
cultural politics of authority, here with reference to the specificity of war veterans as the 
prime agents of disruption. As demonstrated, war veterans have clearly acted as the vanguard 
of Zanu (PF) in its move to recapture the ‘edges of sovereignty’, but neither Zanu (PF) nor the 
veterans themselves are entirely in control of this project. While loyalist war veterans have 
actively supported the ruling party, those involved in local government disruptions seem to be 
less “willing clerks of the state-party”, 134 than unpredictable gatekeepers at the frontiers of 
government. They have their own agendas, both collectively through their identities as war 
veterans, and in terms of their own localised interests and power relations. Many war 
veterans, for example, became increasingly economically impoverished in the decades after 
independence, dispossessed of the ‘promised land’ they fought for during the liberation war, 
and often excluded from positions within the state that would facilitate accumulation. Those 
that had not risen up the ladder to ‘chefdom’ during the nationalist struggle were also 
politically marginalised, further exacerbating class differences between an expanded yet still 
minority political elite and the rank and file of war veterans.  
 
These exclusions fuelled both the formation of the ZNLWVA towards the end of the 1980s, 
and the intensive push for compensation for their members that finally succeeded in 1997. 
The war veterans’ revived warrior status since 2000 has become a powerful political card for 
Mugabe to play in the context of his combined politics of land and anti- imperialism. 
However, the remarginalisation and redispossession of some war veterans in recent years, in 
particular those evicted from newly settled farms to make way for possession by party bosses, 
points to the unevenness and vulnerability of some of these accommodations.135 Yet this 
precariousness could be as much a threat to the increasingly fragile party state as to war 
veterans themselves. As long as veterans are not fully integrated into, or controlled by, it, 
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there is the potential danger of their constructing something of a ‘parallel state’,136 especially 
through the medium of local government. 
 
However, for now this is not likely. For a start, their revived political status and importance is 
derived quite pointedly from the present revalorisation of their heroism linked to the national 
liberation struggle. From experience, we know that such support can also be withdrawn. 
Besides this, war veterans must necessarily compete with traditional leaders and other local 
‘big men’ (seldom women), whose authority emanates from a much wider spectrum of 
spheres of influence and control – cultural, religious, familial, economic, political. While this 
kind of authority may draw on translocal networks and alliances, it is often highly localised 
and lies ‘beyond the state’.137 In addition, RDCs and their constituencies are engaged in 
constant processes of contestation and renegotiation over the terms of rule and practices of 
government that, even if severely constrained at present, are unlikely to disappear entirely. 
Those war veterans still occupying and ‘running’ RDCs will ultimately be faced with such 
challenges in trying to sustain their legitimacy as a local authority: the challenge of combining 
sovereignty and biopolitics; and of retaining authority and legitimacy while delivering 
services and security, democracy and development. Given these various contingencies and 
constraints, one needs to be somewhat circumspect about the assertion made by The Daily 
News that Zimbabwe has reverted to ‘government by war veterans’. 
 
 
Reshaping Government, Remaking Citizens  
What have been naturalised for many years as the formal and normal workings and 
institutions of local government in Zimbabwe – such as councils, schools, legislation, policies 
and procedures – can no longer be taken for granted. In recent years, new forms of irregular, 
unregulated, and ambiguous authority have emerged to disrupt not only the physical 
structures and routine practices of local government, but also the normative liberal notions of 
local government itself. The ongoing crisis and the (partial) production of disorder have 
undeniably altered the shape and texture of political space and the overall mode of rule. 
Within this context of chaotic, multi- layered transformation, the attacks on the local 
government system are contributing to the radical reconfiguration of who governs in which 
spaces, who is being governed, to what extent, and by what methods, all of which provide 
fertile ground for further investigation. 
 
Reflecting in August 2002 on the challenges that lay ahead in the sphere of local government, 
the then newly appointed Permanent Secretary for Local Government, Public Works and 
National Housing, Vincent Hungwe – described as ‘one of the regime’s rising young stars’ – 
was quoted in the media as saying: “We may have to take this whole system back to zero 
before we can start it up again and make it work in a new way”. The report concluded by 
suggesting that many Zimbabweans “already have a taste of what he means by zero”. 138 Such 
cynicism may be well placed, nonetheless there are important questions to consider regarding 
what this ‘new way’ might incorporate. The Secretary’s implied (though unspecified) version 
of authentic, sovereign government, seemed intent on defining itself on the basis of quite 
different notions of normality than those associated with anything ‘colonial’ or even 
‘Western’. This is consistent with Mugabe’s sustained discourse of anti- imperialism, radical 
redistribution and genuine African government. There is much to commend such a vision in 
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itself. Indeed it is hardly the intellectual property of one man, or even one political party. 139 
But this is part of the trick and tragedy of the present political moment in Zimbabwe, namely 
that the narrative of historical injustice and the critical project of correcting it – through 
radical land reform and economic redistribution – have been both simplified and monopolised 
by Mugabe and Zanu (PF). In the process, the vision has become privatised and the only valid 
currency of exchange is membership of Zanu (PF). All other actors are violently excluded 
from the vision and its bounties, or from buying into them at all. 
  
In fact, Zanu (PF)’s current vision of redistribution and authentic African government is 
radically partisan and partial, and rests on dramatically altered and narrowing boundaries of 
national citizenship and belonging. A senior Zanu (PF) official, Didymus Mutasa, revealed 
this in unapologetically stark terms. Responding to widespread accusations that the 
government was trying to starve to death close to half its population of over twelve million in 
the face of impending famine – and primarily those perceived as opposition supporters – he 
was quoted as saying: “We would be better off with only 6 [million] people, with our own 
people who support the liberation struggle”. Referring especially to farm workers, who are 
viewed by the ruling party as both foreign and disloyal to ‘the nation’, he nonchalantly 
quipped: “We don’t want all these extra people”. 140  
 
The resonance of Mutasa’s infamously stated desire to discard surplus populations with 
historical precedents such as National Socialism in Nazi Germany and its implied translation 
into routinised governmental practices of exclusion and annihilation, is too obvious and 
ominous to ignore. The political space granted to Zanu (PF) politicians and supporters to 
voice such inflammatory views reflects an intensification of authoritarian nationalism in 
Zimbabwe.141 Nonetheless, Dean counsels us against a too-complacent distinction between 
authoritarian and liberal governmentality. Certainly one should expect and value the 
conditions of a mode of rule in which the state acts as the guarantor of democratic rights, 
security, justice, access to livelihoods, health and education, for all its citizens. Yet we are 
advised to consider the growing spread of “illiberal components of liberalism”, and hence to 
reflect on: 
the dangers of not calling into question the self-understanding of liberalism as a 
limited government acting through a knowledge of the processes of life, yet, at the 
same time, safeguarding the rights of the political and juridical subject.142  
Furthermore, we need to remain attentive to both the historical precedents and future potential 
for violent exclusions and dispossession – whether inflected through race, class, gender, 
generation or ethnicity – associated with upholding core liberal principles, not least that of 
private property. 
 
This cautionary note is not intended to underplay or legitimise acts of violence and torture, 
forced displacement and dispossession, and the wide range of other unconstitutional practices 
being perpetrated in Zimbabwe in the name of a renewed war of national liberation. Clearly, 
as Hansen and Stepputat assert, “one can and should criticise specific forms of governance, 
undesirable institutions, and oppressive state practices”. However, the result of such critiques 
should not be “visions of the absence of government or the state as such, but rather the 
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possibility of other, more humane and democratic forms of governance”,143 or what poet 
Adrienne Rich envisions as “a democracy without exceptions”.144  
 
 
Conclusion 
Unlike in many other countries in Africa in which the state has been ‘rolling back’ in past 
decades under the universalising pressures of liberalisation, the Zimbabwe state (or more 
accurately, party state) has been rolling out, especially in recent years, trying to extend as far 
as possible its territorial, political, economic and social reach and disciplinary effects. But 
rather than this being a response to the somewhat reversed liberal-technocratic push to ‘bring 
the state back in’ and to ‘build state capacity’ as part of revived attempts at implementing 
sustainable development – as might have been the case during the 1990s – in post-2000 
Zimbabwe it has been about something else. This intensification and reformulation of the 
‘state project’ has been driven by the symbiotic needs of party and state to reclaim 
sovereignty and sustain political hegemony (under the guise of nationalist revolution), 
combined with the accumulation projects of those privileged and protected by the current 
regime.  
 
As such, the selectively reinvigorated party state has been working hard to narrow if not 
entirely close down alternative spaces of public authority (and public voice more generally) 
that potentially challenge its stranglehold over representation, resources, and redistribution. 
Yet paradoxically, because of its extensive loss of legitimacy during the 1990s even among its 
strongest constituencies in rural areas, the party-state conglomerate has been forced to rely on 
semi-autonomous authorities such as war veterans, traditional leaders and even Rural District 
Councils to try and re-establish its hold. To some extent these have provided the regime with 
a wider range of political, cultural and institutional resources to draw upon. However, as has 
been noted in this paper, there is nothing automatic, even or particularly stable in such 
alliances, especially under conditions of extreme crisis. Relationships between the party, state 
and various alternative public authorities are complex and constantly being reworked, posing 
serious challenges to any post-Mugabe government, be this MDC-led or under a reformed 
Zanu (PF). 
 
In the meantime, broader questions persist about how to prevent Zimbabwe moving closer 
towards state failure or even collapse (in terms of Milliken and Krause’s continuum),145 from 
currently being a state in the process of failing. Clearly, while not completely failed or 
collapsed, the Zimbabwe state continues to fail dismally to deliver to its (politically and 
economically differentiated) citizens either what is expected of a ‘modern state’ in liberal-
democratic terms, or in terms of the revived promises of economic and social justice framed 
within a national liberation discourse. In thinking about strategies of reversal and 
recuperation, we may do well to take heed of Putzel’s warning of the dangers of “the failure 
to examine the political requirements for economic reform and the failure to consider the 
potential impact of reforms on the structure and practice of politics”. 146  
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